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Abstract
This paper investigates the use of a signing bonus as a tool for rms to
signal their quality to prospective employees. It is the rst to provide a
theoretical basis for the signing bonus, one of the most common elements
of compensation packages for white collar employees. It also shows that
low performance incentives can serve a complementary purpose, implying
that within a job/industry pair we should expect higher quality rms to
employ higher signing bonuses and lower performance pay. This runs
contrary to previous literature relating rm quality to incentive intensity
and calls into question the use by empiricists of low performance pay as
an indicator of poor corporate governance. The paper makes a number
of empirically testable predictions and provides precise guidance on how
modelling techniques will a¤ect parameter estimates. In particular, the
inclusion of job/industry xed e¤ects in regressions of signing bonus size
or incentive intensity on relevant exogenous variables will reverse the signs
of parameter estimates.
1 Introduction
The signing bonus has become a ubiquitous feature of high level white collar
contracts and traditional explanations from the business community of why this
is the case, when scrutinized under an economic lens, tend to disappoint. The
signing bonus is the antithesis of incentive pay: after all, a new hire can simply
take the bonus and immediately leave the rm.1 While economists have paid
signicant attention to other contract elements that appear to run against the
"pay for performance" paradigm- severance pay, for example-2 there has been
1There are often restrictions that if the worker leaves the rm within one year the worker
must pay back a pro-rated fraction of the bonus, but in practice this may be ignored. The
only way for a rm to recover that amount is a lawsuit, which may generate ill will, bad press,
a countersuit or be just plain expensive.
2For examples of severance pay in optimal contracts, see Manso (2008), Almazan and
Suarez (2003), Lambert and Lacrker (1985) or Van Wesep (2008a).
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no academic attention paid to the equally perplexing signing bonus. Arguments
from the business community for why we see signing bonuses typically mistake
arguments for more pay in general as arguments for signing bonuses in partic-
ular. For example, "we are luring a employee who is losing rights to unvested
stock or options and therefore must make the employee whole" is more a story
about what the rm must pay, not when. The most plausible of the common
arguments for signing bonuses is that they relieve credit constraints: graduating
students often need cash now rather than later, and other employees may have
time between the last paycheck at the rm they are leaving and the rst at the
new rm.
These arguments get the timing right, but miss an important fact. Rather
than o¤er a signing bonus, the rm could o¤er a "signing loan" at 0% interest,
repaid over the course of the year. This structure would lead to the same time
series of cash ows, but minimize the risk of a signing bonus by making it more
recoverable if a employee leaves the rm early: rather than having to sue the
employee for a pro-rated share of the bonus, the rm could just threaten to
charge o¤ the debt. This would entail little cost for the rm, o¤er considerable
penalty for the employee, and solve the credit constraint problem in one fell
swoop. This practice exists at some rms, but usually in addition to a signing
bonus rather than in lieu of one. We are left with a mystery that the nance
and economics literature has simply not addressed.
So far as I know, there is no previously described theoretical basis for the
signing bonus,3 one of the most prevalent and sought-after contracting features
in industry today. This paper provides a justication that makes intuitive
sense: the bonus is a way for high quality rms to di¤erentiate themselves from
low quality rms, attract the best employees and induce them to work hard.
Because the signing bonus is paid before a employee joins the rm and precisely
because employees can depart the rm after only a brief stay, a signing bonus is a
much less expensive contracting tool for a rm that is condent that a employee
will like what she sees once she joins the rm than it is for other rms. Much
like advertising can be a signal of product quality,4 a signing bonus can be a
signal of rm quality.
The model here also presents a novel relationship between incentive intensity
and rm quality. Two prominent theories of this relationship are the corpo-
rate governance view and the Milgrom and Roberts (1992) view. The former
argues that better governed rms, all else equal, will have both higher marginal
productivity and more intense incentives. There should therefore be a positive
relationship between quality and incentives, and weak incentives may be taken
as an indicator of weak governance. The latter view states that the incentive
intensity, as measured by the fraction of the value of the marginal product re-
tained by the employee, should be constant across rms of di¤ering quality. The
model below suggests a negative relationship and is, as far as I know, the rst
to do so. This model suggests, therefore, that contrary to the Bebchuck and
3The claim that there is no previous theoretical basis for signing bonuses naturally excludes
the few attempts that do not withstand economic scrutiny.
4See Milgrom and Roberts (1986)
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Fried (2004) view that strong incentives imply a better rm, the relationship
might be quite the opposite. To be clear, the model predicts that the fraction
of marginal value retained by the employee is decreasing in rm quality but the
total size of the performance bonus is higher at higher quality rms: employees
choose to exert higher e¤ort at higher quality rms and those e¤orts are, by
denition, more productive.
This paper investigates the relationship between compensation elements
(wages, performance incentives and signing bonuses), rm quality and infor-
mation availability. The model is a simplication of the following general story.
employees are o¤ered contracts and can choose whether to join the o¤ering rm.
If they join they potentially receive a signing bonus and a regular paycheck. For
a number of reasons the employee may not want to stay with the rm: perhaps
her colleagues are dull, perhaps there is too much work, perhaps she is being
paid on commission and nds that the rms resources will lead to low sales.
For these and many other reasons, the employee may choose to leave the rm.
If she leaves, she has been paid a wage for time put in, but regardless of that
time she can keep the signing bonus. The rate at which the employee learns
about her rm is the "quality of information" in the job or industry.
This story does not immediately reveal any relationship between the sign-
ing bonus and performance incentives, yet there is an underlying relationship.
There will be many industries and job titles where neither type of bonus will
be o¤ered: when employee type or e¤ort is observable there is no need for per-
formance bonuses and no justication for signing bonuses. For other job types
or industries there will be both types of bonus, so we should see a positive
relationship between whether each type of bonus is o¤ered in a compensation
package.
Within a job/industry pair in which bonuses are o¤ered, however, we will
see a negative relationship between rm quality and incentive intensity com-
bined with a positive relationship between rm quality and signing bonus size.
More productive rms o¤er larger signing bonuses and o¤er lower performance
incentives. Furthermore, within a job/industry pair higher signing bonuses are
associated with lower quality information and higher dispersion of rm qual-
ity within the industry,5 while incentive intensity is increasing in information
quality and decreasing in rm quality dispersion. To restate: the existence
of each type of bonus is positively correlated, but the size of the bonuses
within a job/industry pair is negatively correlated. Empiricists researching
these compensation features must design studies accordingly by controlling for
job/industry xed e¤ects.
These ndings yield a plethora of testable predictions both cross sectionally
(the comparative statics mentioned above) and over time. As employeesoutside
options and rm productivity adjust due to macroeconomic shocks, the preva-
lence and size of signing bonuses should change: they should be more common
and larger in booms. I believe that the predictions from the model correspond
5Dispersion in rm quality is the ratio of the value of the marginal product at the highest
productivity rm to the value of the marginal product at the lowest
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well to stylized facts and that the theory is immediately intuitive and attrac-
tive. Section 2 motivates the discussion with some stylized facts about signing
bonuses and a discussion of the literature. Section 3 describes the model and
provides motivating examples for the cases where there is either full information
regarding rm quality or no information. Section 4 derives equations for the
optimal compensation scheme for rms of each quality level under varying in-
formation precision. Section 5 analyses the results and provides a discussion of
empirical implications. Section 6 describes the previously discussed alternative
to the signing bonus: the signing loan. It also shows why this model justies
the bonus instead of the loan while other stories cannot. Section 7 concludes.
Unless otherwise shown, proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Stylized facts and the literature
Before delving into the model it is worth discussing some stylized facts surround-
ing the use and size of signing bonuses. This paper shows that the incidence
and size of signing bonuses depends primarily on three factors: the rate at which
employees can learn about the quality of the rm at which they work, the dis-
persion of rm quality within a job/industry, and the quality of the rm itself.
It is important to check the relationship of these predictions with good data,
but those data are hard to nd.
Data from large government surveys typically do not include information
about signing bonuses and are not particularly detailed regarding the timing
and conditionality of pay. Even precision resources like ExecuComp do not
separately break out signing bonuses from other pay elements like severance
pay, debt forgiveness and tax reimbursements, to name a few; furthermore, the
theory in this paper is relevant for any job, not just executive positions, so fo-
cused resources like ExecuComp would signicantly limit the analysis. Some
compensation consultants collect this information, but only sporadically and not
necessarily with the specics that appeal to an academic researcher. Nonethe-
less, to the extent that this information is available, it is displayed in the ve
gures discussed below, provided courtesy of []. There are certainly other
"facts" that seem apparent to people in industry and academia and it is worth
laying those out here before moving on.
Within an industry it is typical for certain types of job to be associated with
signing bonuses: they are primarily awarded to those in high human capital
positions. Figure 1 conrms this intuition by plotting the fraction of rms
o¤ering a signing bonus to at least one employee of a particular job class. That
fraction is close to unity for executives and technical managers and professionals.
It is middling for sales and operations personnel and low for hourly employees.
Figure 3 shows that the prevalence of the signing bonus as a pay practice and
the typical size of the package tend to go together: higher frequency of signing
bonuses is associated with higher bonuses when they are awarded (though sales
managers are an anomaly).
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Across industries it seems that those with high levels of rm specic intellec-
tual capital and those employing employees with high human capital are more
prone to giving signing bonuses and also more prone to give performance pay.
It is unusual to see signing bonuses without some signicant performance pay: it
may come in the form of a performance bonus, an intense "up or out" retention
policy wherein even mediocre performers are typically red, or a rapid increase
in outside options and pay for employees who distinguish themselves. In any
of these situations performance is highly rewarded and in most rms with this
performance-pay relationship a signing bonus is apparently a must.
Whether signing bonuses are o¤ered at better or worse rms is di¢ cult
to determine formally without some measure of rm quality, but it accords
with casual observation that elite companies hiring elite individuals o¤er sign-
ing bonuses. They are a contract feature at all top management and litigation
consultants, corporate law partnerships, and banks. Within each of these indus-
tries, however, it is unclear from casual observation whether the incidence and
size of signing bonuses depend on relative rm quality. The theory in section
4 suggests that in industries like these all elite rms may o¤er signing bonuses
and performance pay at similar levels, and this may or may not conform to the
readers knowledge or expectations.
Most signing bonuses are awarded by the time of the rst paycheck, as gure
4 shows, and even those paid later are typically paid within one or two quarters
(it is admittedly di¢ cult to call a bonus a "signing bonus" if it is paid later
than that) as shown in gure 5. These gures conrm that a signing bonus is a
serious commitment by a rm to a employee: when employee can easily abscond
with the bonus it is a risk for the rm to o¤er it. Furthermore, gure 5 shows
that most bonuses are not large enough for it to be worth the rms while to
attempt to recover lost bonuses via a lawsuit. These facts are critical to the
model below.
This paper argues for a non-monotonic relationship between rm quality
and incentive intensity: within a job/industry pair, incentives would be weaker
at the higher quality rms but across industries and jobs it is likely that rm
quality and incentive intensity would be positively related. There are no stylized
facts that I know of relating rm quality and incentive intensity: indeed, one
previously used measure of rm quality (or the quality of corporate governance
at least) is incentive intensity. This paper suggests that this measure may
not be appropriate. It certainly seems that rms like Goldman Sachs or top
hedge funds reward employees richly for success, but the measure of incentive
intensity used in this paper is the fraction of the marginal product retained by
the employee. The model proposed below says that, within an industry, this
fraction is decreasing in rm quality even though total performance based pay
is higher at higher quality rms.6
It is worth supporting these broad arguments with some basic facts about
industry attributes and compensation practices in a variety of jobs and indus-
6Employees work harder at these rms and their marginal product is higher so their pay
can increase in rm quality even if the ratio of that pay to total production is decreasing
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tries:
1. Professor: No signing bonus, low incentive pay. With tenure, professors
have some of the lowest incentive pay among all professions though of
course pay does increase for highly productive faculty. It is easy for a
potential hire to have a good idea of how productive she will be at a
particular school. There is moderate dispersion in school quality (with
quality dened as in this paper) and it is relatively easy to monitor a
professors skill and e¤ort.
2. Waiter: No signing bonus, low incentive pay. It is not di¢ cult for a
potential hire to predict her productivity at a restaurant: a glance at the
menu and a couple visits during the week su¢ ce. There is moderate
dispersion in restaurant quality within a particular class of restaurant. It
is easy to monitor a waiters skill and e¤ort.
3. Employee #6 at a high-tech start-up: High signing bonus (stock
options), high incentive pay. It is very di¢ cult for a potential hire to
predict her productivity at the rm. There is very large dispersion in
rm quality. It is moderately di¢ cult to monitor a employees skill and
e¤ort.
4. Management consultant: Moderate signing bonus, high incentive pay.
It is di¢ cult for a potential hire to predict her productivity at the rm.
There is high dispersion in rm quality. It is di¢ cult to monitor a em-
ployees skill and e¤ort.
5. CEO: High signing bonus, low to moderate incentive pay. It is very
di¢ cult for a employee to predict her productivity at the rm and there
is a very large dispersion in rm quality. It is very di¢ cult to measure a
employees skill and e¤ort.
These observations can be compiled as shown in table 1. Each profession is
assigned a rank among the ve shown here in each of four categories. "Sign-
ing bonus size" and "incentive intensity" describe the contract while "quality
observability" describes the information availability regarding rms in each in-
dustry and "quality dispersion" describes how di¤erent a typical employees
productivity would be at higher and lower quality rms within the industry.
"employee observability" describes the ease with which the rm can monitor
the employees e¤ort and observe the employees skill.
This chart is not scientic and the reader might take issue with particular
rankings or prefer the inclusion of di¤erent professions; the chart is simply a
back of the envelope attempt to put numbers to parameters and contract terms
found in the model below for a variety of professions. Table 1 provides some
suggestive predictions we should look for in a theory. First, signing bonus size
is strongly related to the information availability in a job/industry. For job
types and industries where rm quality is easily observable there are fewer and
smaller signing bonuses. Furthermore, as quality dispersion increases within
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an industry, signing bonuses rise. The relationship between incentive intensity
and the parameters is more complicated. It appears that quality observability
and quality dispersion are negatively related to incentive intensity, but it seems
that once e¤ort observability is considered the e¤ect is removed. The necessity
of incentives when e¤ort is unobservable is a classic aspect of contract theory
and the "information" in gure 6 seems to support it.
It is worth discussing the literature on signing bonuses and incentive in-
tensity. The economic literature on signing bonuses is virtually nonexistent.
Most work is concerned with sports economics and the NFL in particular, which
is known for very large signing bonuses. The justication for these bonuses is
unique and not present in other industries: according to union contracting rules,
a team can cancel a players contract at will and not owe the player severance
pay nor any lost future earnings. Major League Baseball, in contrast, requires
that teams pay players the entire amount due upon dismissal. Not surprisingly,
baseball does not feature large signing bonuses while football does.7
One paper attempting a theory is Arya, Frimor and Mittendorf (2003), in
which sunk costs are a way of committing the rm to a course of action that
induces employees to acquire rm specic human capital. By paying the em-
ployee in advance the rm reduces future hiring costs and the employee can
be more condent of his hiring. Their paper relies on signing bonuses being
paid well before the employee joins the rm (in fact, before the employee even
begins her education or training). It would be rare to nd this type of bonus
in practice, as gure 4 shows: the model does not t the facts and a fresh look
is warranted.
The literature on incentive intensity is much richer. Holmstrom (1979) and
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) provide basic theoretical underpinnings relating in-
centive intensity to employee productivity, risk aversion, costliness of e¤ort and
the observability of e¤ort. This has been signicantly extended in a large num-
ber of directions including incentive intensity for teamwork (Holmstrom (1982)
) and the provision of incentives through tournaments rather than explicit con-
tracts (Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and Stokey (1983)). The literature
is too large to describe here, but see Prendergast (1999) for an excellent review
and comparison of theory to evidence.
So far as I know there has not been a theory establishing a negative link
between rm quality, dened as the value marginal product of employee e¤ort,
and incentive intensity that predicts a negative or non-monotonic relationship
between the two. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) predict that incentive intensity
is constant in rm quality8 and governance theories like Bebchuck and Fried
7The actual contracting rules are more complex and in football also concern the way di¤er-
ent forms of pay a¤ect the salary cap, but the largest factor driving signing bonus di¤erences
is the variation in "right to re" rules.
8 In particular their "incentive intensity principle" argues that incentive intensity  =
0(e)
c0(e)+ where 
0(e) is the marginal revenue from e¤ort, c0(e) is the marginal cost of e¤ort
(borne by the worker),  is the workers coe¢ cient of risk aversion and  is a measure of how
well e¤ort can be measured.  is measured in dollars per unit output. If output z can be
sold at price p then 0(e) = pz0(e). Applying typical regularity conditions, the variable e can
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(2004) predict a positive relationship. The model presented her predicts a non-
monotonic relationship where a simple regression of incentive intensity on rm
quality measures would nd a positive relationship but including job/industry
xed e¤ects would force a negative relationship. That higher quality rms
would use weaker incentives is novel and not intuitive but is a clear result of the
succeeding model.
To begin the analysis it is worth considering two simple examples that high-
light the results of the paper with little complexity. We consider in turn a
model of contracting under complete information and one of contracting un-
der no information and derive relationships between information, rm quality,
industry quality dispersion and equilibrium contract structure.
3 A pair of simple motivating examples
The model presented in this paper is a stylized version of a simple fact: employees
do not always know exactly they will like a new job and can always choose to
quit if it does not go well. Firms that o¤er wages solve this most simply by only
paying employees for time spent working. When employees must be screened for
quality or induced through incentives to work hard, an end of year performance
bonus is common. In this case, the longer a employee works at a rm prior to
the performance bonus being paid, the less likely she is to leave: indeed, it is
common in industries like law, banking and consulting for employees to leave
the rm immediately after the payment of performance bonuses. Given that
hiring and training are costly activities, an end of year bonus serves a dual role
of improving employee retention later in the year. A employee, on the other
hand, can practically, if not legally, abscond with a signing bonus soon after
beginning her employment. This is also the time when she likely learns most
about the quality of, and her t with, the rm.
A simple model of this allows the employee to leave immediately after the
start of her employment, especially because if a performance bonus is present
she would be unlikely, in practice, to leave as the year progresses. The basic
model is as follows:
1. A rm of hidden quality zi o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) contract to
a employee of hidden quality j , which includes a wage w, performance
bonus rate , and signing bonus S. The employee can either accept or
reject this o¤er. If the employee rejects the o¤er the game ends and
payo¤s are 0 to the rm and u() to the employee.
be dened so that either marginal product or marginal cost is constant at 1. We can do that
with marginal product to get z0(e) = 1. Then dividing each side of our preceding equation
by p we get 
p
= 1
c0(e)+ . The left hand side of this equation describes the fraction of the
value marginal product retained by the worker, which is how incentive intensity is dened in
this paper. One can see that this is constant in rm productivity, which is measured by p.
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2. If the o¤er is accepted, the employee sees a signal of the quality of the
rm bz. The employee can now once again stay or leave. If the employee
leaves she receives S + u() and the rm receives  S. The signing bonus
is paid regardless of the employees choice but her reservation utility is
unchanged.
3. If the employee stays she exerts hidden e¤ort e. Payo¤s are then  =
(1 )ze S w to the rm and S+w+ze  c(e; ) to the employee.
That is, total production is ze. The rm pays the employee her wage,
her signing bonus and a share of the production and retains the di¤erence.
The employee receives her pay but bears a cost of her e¤ort. Note that
ex post, rm type is known to the employee.
There are a few points to be made regarding this model. First, there is
no risk in the productive technology. This will relieve us of many compli-
cations that do not add to the insights of the model like the limited liability
constraint, risk aversion of the agent, integrals and conditional expectations.
Second all bargaining power belongs to the rm which makes TIOLI o¤ers to
the employee. As is standard, however, employee beliefs can generate many
contracting equilibria that are sub-optimal (in a global sense) for the rm.
Third, the contract o¤er comes before the signal. The idea here is that rms
o¤er a contract and, if accepted, the employee joins the rm. After some time
at the rm, perhaps a short time, the employee can observe some noisy signal
of the rms quality and quit if she feels she is wasting her time. In practice,
this may be after a week, a month, a quarter, or a year. For expositional
simplicity, the assumption here is that the employee observes this signal before
the "rst paycheck" is paid and that there is no updating of this signal within
the period. This is a strong assumption but it captures the real dynamics with
some accuracy while setting the highest bar against signing bonuses.
Fourth, we are restricting interest to linear contracts. Considering that
there is no risk, a contract only actually needs to do two things. It must
target a particular e¤ort level on the part of a employee and it must make sure
that no other e¤ort choice is better. The linear contract specied above can
achieve this as well as any other contract form given that there is no risk. A
linear contract also makes more sense for the employee. If the signal is not
perfectly informative then the employee does not know for certain what sort of
rm it is working for. Contracts that feature payments that are complex or
highly responsive to output level could be perceived by employees are "risky"
in the sense that they can not know with certainty what output will be. Linear
contracting here does not reduce the set of equilibria and is certainly more
realistic.
We will make some assumptions before continuing:
A1:  = 1.
A2: c(e; ) = 12e
2.
A3: z 2 fzL; zHg with fraction  of type zH : Also, zH > zL.
A4: bz = H with probability 1 if z = zH and bz = H with probability 1 p  1
and bz = L with probability p  0 for z = zL.
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A5: zL = 1
Assumption A1 relieves us of solving for optimal screening contracts on be-
half of the rm. While this type of question is no doubt interesting, it is beyond
the scope of this paper. Assumption A2 denes a simple cost of e¤ort function
that will greatly simplify what would otherwise become a rather nasty analysis.
Importantly, it is convex and will yield e¤ort as a linear function of incentive
intensity and rm quality. A3 reduces the set of rm types to two, which is a
signicant mathematical restriction that certainly a¤ects results. A4 states that
the probability of a low type rm being revealed by the signal bz is p which may
be positive. A5 normalizes the low quality rms marginal product to unity.
We can then think of zH as measuring the dispersion in rm quality within the





Armed with these assumptions we will now solve the game in two extreme
situations. First we will assume that p = 1; i.e. that the signal is com-
pletely informative. Second, we will assume that p = 0; i.e. that the signal
is completely uninformative. In a later section we will address solutions to
the model for intermediate values of p and see that these conrm the intuition
from the following two sections wile providing additional comparative statics
and monotonicity predictions.
3.1 A perfect information example: p = 1
With p = 1 the employee observes the rms type perfectly and therefore there is
no role for signalling via contractual form. If rm quality is immediately observ-
able by the employee, there is no information game to be played: the standard
Holmstrom (1979) argument can be made and its results applied. Throughout
the paper I will focus on separating pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria
(SPSPBE) of this game. A SPSPBE consists of values fSi; wi; igi=L;H for
each rms contract o¤er, an e¤ort level e for the employee and two partici-
pation choices for the employee that satisfy each rms sets of incentive and
participation constraints and the employees incentive and participation con-
straints. Given that we are initially considering only separating equilibria, it
is straightforward to write down the constraints described above. Given that
the employee has chosen to remain with the rm until the end, her incentive
constraint is
ICw : e = argmax
"
S + w + E(z j bz; S; w; )"  1
2
"2
) e = E(z j bz; S; w; )
This form for e¤ort is a modied version of Holmstrom (1979) with an ex-
pected rm quality parameter added in. This expectation depends on the signal
she observes and the contract she has been o¤ered. In fact, because the signal
is perfectly informative, we get
ICw : e = z
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This form for e allows for the following simplied versions of the rmsand
employees incentive compatibility constraints (ICs) and individual rationality
constraints (IRs):
ICw : e = z




ICH : H(1  H)z2H   SH   wH  (1  )z2H   S   w
8S  0; w;  s:t:w + 1
2
2z2H  u
ICL : L(1  L)  SL   wL  (1  )  S   w
8S  0; w;  s:t:w + 1
2
2z2L  u
IRH : H(1  H)z2H   SH   wH  0
IRL : L(1  L)  SL   wL  0
ICw describes the employees e¤ort when employed at a rm of type z of-
fering incentives . Clearly she works higher when her marginal productivity
of e¤ort is higher and when she retains a greater fraction of her output. IRw
states that she will only remain at the rm if it o¤ers enough total compen-
sation. Notably, S is nowhere in this constraint. Because the employee can
abscond with S the rm cannot use the signing bonus to satisfy her individual
rationality constraint after she observes bz. ICH and ICL state that out of all
compensation packages that satisfy the employees IR and IC constraints, the
ones assigned to each rm must be optimal. These constraints become weaker
when we move away from the full information case. Finally, IRH and IRL
state that each rm must prefer to operate rather than shutting down. Also
note that from here on we are using assumption A5: zL = 1, which allows zL
and z2L to be simply omitted from low type constraints.
For the remainder of the paper display of the ICs and IRs will be in the
appendix, but those shown above give a good idea of the basic constraints that
will continue throughout the paper.
Proposition 1 When rm quality is perfectly observable, the unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium involves a contract o¤er from each rm with no signing
bonus and e¢ cient incentives: i = 1, wi = maxf0; u  12z
2
i g, and Si = 0.
We see that so long as employee reservation utility is not too high, each
rm o¤ers the e¢ cient incentive when there is no risk present,  = 1 ; which is
"selling the rm to the employee." Wages are negative, and are higher for low
quality rms than high quality rms because employees receive less from owning
the rm in the low case. There is no signing bonus. As employee reservation
utility rises, the low quality rm might become priced out of the market and
cease to operate; eventually, the same would happen to high quality rms.
The perfect information case is useful for highlighting the optimal contracts
in a more traditional setting, where rms may di¤er in productive quality but
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have no incentive to design contracts to signal or hide that quality. We now
investigate a situation in which the signal is completely uninformative. In this
scenario there may be value to a low quality rm attempting to imitate a high
quality rm, and therefore there may be value for a high quality rm to design
contracts that distinguish its type.
3.2 A zero information example: p = 0
In this section we investigate the case where p = 0 so that the signal always
reads "H". As before, we look for SPSPBEs. Unlike before, however, this
is a signicant restriction on the set of equilibria we are searching for. There
are also potentially mixed strategy equilibria and pooling equilibria that we
do not attempt to characterize. This section proceeds by rst deriving the
set of SPSPBEs and a condition that is necessary and su¢ cient this set to be
non-empty. The intuitive criterion is then applied to reduce this set to its
most plausible elements and the reduced set is characterized. I will show that
SPSPBEs exist when rms are su¢ ciently di¤erent technologically and have
two generic properties. First, signing bonuses are positive at high quality rms
but zero at low quality rms. Second, incentive intensity is decreasing in rm
quality.
Where the signal is uninformative we can ignore it and write our IRs and ICs
as before, but we must make some assumption regarding employee beliefs for o¤
equilibrium path actions. To get the largest possible set of equilibria we can
begin by assuming that employees perceive contract o¤ers o¤ the equilibrium
path to be from the low type of rm. In order to reduce the set of equilibria
later in this section we will adjust that assumption.
Lemma 1 The set of SPSPBEs is dened by the following three constraints







  ug  H(1  H)zH   SH   wH (2)





H  u (3)
These constraints put bounds on wH as we vary H and SH . The set of
equilibria satisfying these conditions can involve positive values of SH as well as
wildly ine¢ cient values of H . A positive signing bonus, while not economically
ine¢ cient, is clearly not ideal for the rm. That  can be rather low is both bad
for the high quality rm and economically ine¢ cient. This type of phenomenon
is not unusual, as in Spence (1973). Because of the three varying contractual
dimensions of SH ; H and wH , not to mention zH , it is di¢ cult to display on
a graph just what this equilibrium set looks like, but consider the following
inequalities that arise from rearranging equations 1 and 2 and assuming that










These inequalities provide bounds for (wH + SH) as a function of other equi-
librium values of contracting variables and parameters: the wage and the sign-
ing bonus are treated equally within these inequalities because both have the
same cost for each type of rm. From the employee IR is also the case that




H so there is a limit to how much a wage can be reduced
in favor of a signing bonus but, as we will see in section 4, that the two are
interchangeable is unique to the p = 0 case.
It is not always the case that these inequalities can be mutually satised,
and if they cannot be then no SPSPBE exists.
Lemma 2 A SPSPBE exists so long as zH & 1:8
Proof. The gap between the upper bound of wH + SH and its lower bound
is maximized at H =
1
2 for zH > 1. To see whether a SPSPBE exists we












Solving the quartic numerically yields zH & 1:8.
When there is no signal strength, a separating equilibrium can be maintained
so long as the di¤erence in rm productivity is su¢ cient. If the rms are too
similar, the high quality rm would have to sacrice too much in pay in order
to deter imitation by the low quality rm relative to the additional productivity
it could receive from the employee for separation to be protable.
Now, supposing that zH is high enough for a separating equilibrium to exist,
it is worth asking just what that equilibrium looks like. The curves dened by
inequalities 1 and 2 are quadratic in  with peaks at  = 12 . Because 1 < zH ,
the LHS of the inequality is a wider quadratic than the RHS. Therefore, when
a separating equilibrium exists, the value of wH +SH will be a member of a set
that is crescent shaped in . wH and SH are not completely interchangeable:
throughout this discussion, the employee IR wH  u  12
2z2H has been ignored,
but it places a separate limit on how far wH can be reduced in favor of SH .
Proposition 2 If any separating pure strategy PBEs exist, then the set of these




That is, the rm will o¤er less than e¢ cient incentives and a positive signing
bonus. This result follows from a very simple game in which rms can signal
their types using a number of contract features and is the rst to see practical
importance for signing bonuses. This model also highlights that, contrary to
intuition and some previous thinking on the topic, we should expect to see
weaker incentives at higher productivity rms.
Discussing generic properties of a set of equilibria may not be entirely con-
vincing. After all, perhaps the actual equilibrium we witness in practice is
non-generic. In fact, this model only features generic signing bonuses "because
theyre there." One could imagine all sorts of odd contract features (a liter of
lighter uid on Flag Day, for example) that would also be generic equilibrium
contract properties in a model like this. As long as the quantity of contractual
feature is continuous, its provision would be generic. This does not mean, of
course, that we should expect to see these things. In order to make some pre-
diction as to what we should see, we need to rene this set of equilibria a bit.
The most natural renement is the Intuitive Criterion, due to Cho and Kreps
(1987). This criterion states that if some out of equilibrium action is taken
that is equilibrium dominated for type A and not equilibrium dominated9 for
type B, the employee should assume the deviator is type B.
Applying the intuitive criterion to high-type actions narrows the equilibrium
set to as little as one element: the optimal point in the set from the rms point
of view. Therefore, to nd this point, we need to solve
max
S;w;







+ S + w  u+ (1  )zH
Proposition 3 The set of SPSPBEs satisfying the intuitive criterion are given




















Therefore the set of equilibria satisfying the intuitive criterion still generi-
cally contains signing bonuses. Because the bonus enters both the high quality
rms objective and the low quality rms IC in the same way as w, the high
9"Equilibrium Dominated" in this setting means that there is no possible belief on the part
of the worker regarding the rms type that would make the action strictly more protable
for the rm as compared to the action specied in equilibrium.
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quality rm is indi¤erent between o¤ering the bonus and not so long as the
employee IR does not bind. Generically, it does not. Indi¤erence is not a
justication for bonuses: that will come later, but for now we must note that
bonuses exist in this setting.
Importantly,  = 12 < 1. This model features higher quality rms, with
greater marginal product from employee e¤ort, using lower incentives. employee




 > 1 = L = eL so the employee does work harder at
the high quality rm, but she receives a smaller share of the resulting product at
the margin. The literature on incentive intensity uses two metrics to measure
intensity. First, one can consider the fraction of marginal prot or marginal
shareholder value captured by the agent as in Jensen and Murphey (1990). The
measure here, , uses this denition. Second, one can consider, in dollars or
utility, the marginal return to e¤ort captured by the agent. In this model the
value of z picks up this denition. Importantly, while incentive intensity in
the rst sense is declining in rm quality, in the second sense it is increasing.
Empirically, suppose we believe that larger rms tend to be higher quality.
Then the theory suggests that even though CEOs at higher quality rms take
home a smaller fraction of marginal product they should still earn high salaries.
Indeed, this is exactly what we see.
To summarize, when the employee can only receive information about the
rm attempting to hire her via the rms contract o¤er, and not from any
other signal, there only exist separating equilibria in which high quality rms
signal their quality to employees when rm qualities are su¢ ciently di¤erent.
When this is the case, however, the resulting separating equilibria feature low
quality rms using optimal incentive devises while high quality rms have ine¢ -
ciently low incentives and o¤er signing bonuses generically.. When we consider
only equilibria satisfying the intuitive criterion, we see that high quality rms
typically o¤er exactly half of the e¢ cient level of incentives, though they still
generically o¤er signing bonuses. This contrasts to the full information case
when employees receive perfect signals of rm quality. Not surprisingly, since
that case has been analyzed by Holmstrom (1979) and others, both types of
rm o¤er e¢ cient incentives and do not o¤er signing bonuses.
The preceding two sections should give the reader a taste of how the choice
variables and parameters in this model interact to produce results. They also
reveal a relationship between information, rm quality and contractual form
that has not been identied before. That higher quality rms o¤er lower in-
centives than low quality rms as a signal of their quality is both new and
counter intuitive. Empirical work and other analyses that assume that signing
bonuses are a sign of shady contracting (e.g. Bebchuck and Fried (2004)) or
non-arms length bargaining should take note that information, industry and
job description can interact in odd ways.
Thus far there has been little positive use for signing bonuses as the cost
of a bonus was identical across rms in both the p = 1 and p = 0 cases. In
the former, a signing bonus is wasted money as it serves no signaling purpose
while costing both rms dearly. In the latter it also serves no signaling purpose
because low quality rms are never revealed prior to the employee choosing to
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stay with a rm and exerting e¤ort. As we will see, intermediate values of p
are a markedly di¤erent story.
4 The full model with p 2 (0; 1)
When the signal strength is between 0 and 1 the analysis becomes more compli-
cated. As opposed to the no information case studied in section 3.2, low quality
rms can only imitate high quality rms with some probability of success less
than one. As we will see, this implies a distinction between the signing bonus
and the wage that was not precedingly present. The signing bonus was either
strictly bad (when p = 1) because it does not enter the employees IR constraint
but does enter the rms objective function, or was weakly bad (when p = 0)
because at best the employees IR constraint does not bind and the signing
bonus can be traded o¤ one for one with the wage.
With an intermediate value of p the signing bonus can play a strictly positive
role: suppose 12 < u so that it is ine¢ cient for the low quality rm to operate.
It may try to mimic the high quality rm by o¤ering wH ; H and hope it is not
discovered. If it isnt discovered, the rm can induce higher e¤ort from the
employee because the employee believes she is working for a high quality rm
and therefore has a higher marginal productivity. Thus the low quality rm
can induce high e¤ort and potentially operate protably, much to the employees
chagrin.
Wages have the same cost to the high and low quality rms and are therefore
a weak signalling tool. Incentive intensity is a valuable tool because o¤ering
a higher  is, in dollars, less costly for the high quality rm: our earlier prot
equation, while not correct for intermediate values of p, nonetheless sheds light
on why.






so the marginal prot from an increase in H is (1 2H)zHzi+Hz2H which is
larger for high quality rms than low. However, the signing bonus can also be
a valuable signaling tool: because it is paid prior to the employee observing the
signal of rm quality, its cost is di¤erent for low and high quality rms. Suppose
that the equilibrium high quality contract involves a bonus and a low quality
rm attempts to mimic the high quality rm. It must pay the bonus before the
employee observes the signal. If the signal is bz = L then the employee knows
that the rm is low quality and can act accordingly. The employee would either
quit, causing the low quality rm to eat the loss of the signing bonus, or would
remain at the rm (if w and  are high enough) but exert a low amount of
e¤ort. This, of course, is even worse given that u > 12 ! The signing bonus is
still bad for the high quality rm in that it does not enter into the employees
IR constraint, but there is now a trade-o¤ where before there was none.
It should now be clear why the timing of payments and information was set
the way it was, but this model is only a small abstraction from reality. In fact,
information is revealed over time, and there are many points in a employees
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career when she may decide to leave the rm. In practice she would rarely leave
immediately after accepting the bonus but the basic intuition of the separation
in this model - that stronger rms will be less likely to lose employees early in
their careers and therefore are more able to o¤er bonuses - seems right.
As in the preceding sections we will evaluate separating equilibria, but there
are two cases to consider. Either it is ine¢ cient for the low quality rm to
operate, u > 12 , or it is not, u 
1
2 . In the former case the low quality rm
must compare imitating the high quality rm to not entering the market and
receiving a payo¤of 0. In the latter it compares imitating to its best alternative:
 = 1; w = u   12 which yields a payo¤ for the rm of
1
2   u. The two cases
are mathematically very similar so we treat the case where u > 12 here and
briey discuss the alternative case in section 4.2. The only material di¤erence
regards the existence of SPSPBEs. In the case where it is ine¢ cient for the low
quality rm to operate, an equilibrium always exists which is a very convenient
feature. In the alternative case equilibria do not always exist, but the properties
of optimal contracts are identical whenever they do.
4.1 The ine¢ cient operation case: u > 1
2
We consider the case in which it is ine¢ cient for the low quality rm to operate









H is given by the following four inequalities
IRw : w +
1
2
2E(z j bz; S; w; )2  u




ICL : 0   SH + (1  p)(H(1  H)zH   wH) + pI(H(1  H)  wH)
IRH : H(1  H)z2H   SH   wH  0
where I is an indicator taking a value of 1 if wH + 12
2
H > u and a value 0
otherwise.
There always exist values of contracting variables that mutually satisfy these
constraints:
Proposition 5 A separating pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists
in the game with intermediate signal precision and employee reservation wage
u > 12
Given that equilibria exist, we can characterize the size of the equilibrium
set as we vary signal informativeness.
Lemma 3 More informative signals of rm quality weakly expand the set of
equilibria
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Proof. Recall that p is the probability that a low type of rm is discovered by
the employee via the signal bz; as p rises the signal becomes more informative.
Within the four constraints above we see that p only a¤ects the low rms
incentive compatibility constraint. Taking a derivative of the RHS with respect
to p we get
 (H(1  H)zH   wH) + I(wH +
1
2
2H > u)(H(1  H)  wH)
which is more simply stated as
wH   H(1  H)zH when wH + 12
2
H  u




which is negative in either case. A more informative signal, therefore,
weakens the low types IC constraint just as intuition would suggest. The
more likely the low quality rm will be discovered by the employee, the less
attractive attempting to mimic the high rm will be. Because p does not enter
the other two relevant constraints, more informative signals weakly expand the
equilibrium set.
Unless the employees individual rationality constraint binds, the signing
bonus and wage can be traded o¤ one for one in the high type of rms con-
straints. In the low types IC constraint, the signing bonus can be traded one




L > u and can be traded of at a
1
1 p ratio
when wH + 12
2
H  u. As in the case where p=0 and the signal is completely
uninformative, there may be a set of equilibria that contain signing bonuses
as an "afterthought": They serve little purpose beyond delivering money to
employees.
As before, we can now restrict attention to those equilibria satisfying the
Cho Kreps intuitive criterion. This criterion is met so long as the equilibrium
contract fSH ; wH ; Hg maximizes the prots of the high quality rm subject to
the low types IC constraint and the employee IR constraint.
Proposition 6 The unique separating pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium satisfying the intuitive criterion when signal strength is not perfectly in-
formative is given by the low quality rm choosing not to operate and the high
quality rm setting
H =
zH   (1  p)






zH   (1  p)
(2  p)zH   2(1  p)
2
z2H
SH = (1  p)
zH   (1  p)




zH   (1  p)








These formulas are complicated which was the reason for the simple exam-
ples in sections 3.1 and 3.2, but it is straightforward to sign the relationships
between these contract elements and underlying parameters. There are two in-
teresting contract elements, the signing bonus and the performance bonus, and
two job/industry parameters, the signal strength and the rm quality disper-
sion. Each of the four resulting relationships is monotonic and will be derived
in turn.
Proposition 7 The incentive intensity o¤ered by the high quality rm is in-
creasing in signal strength and decreasing in rm quality dispersion.
Proof. Taking a derivative of the high types incentive intensity H with respect





[(2  p)zH   2(1  p)]2
This value is greater or less than 0 when
zH
2   zH R 0
Because zH > 1 we get @@pH > 0. High type incentive intensity is monoton-






[(2  p)zH   2(1  p)]2
< 0 (7)
High type incentive intensity is monotonically decreasing in rm quality
dispersion.
Recall that in sections 3.1 and 3.2 we saw that H =
1
2 in the no information
(p = 0) case and H = 1 in the full information (p = 1) case. These values
hold here, as they must, but the fact that the relationship is monotonic is new.
Higher values of zH imply greater di¤erence between the rms technologies
and we see that high type incentive intensity is decreasing as the technological
di¤erences between the rms increase: The more di¤erent the rms, the lower
the incentive intensity must be for high quality rms!
One might imagine that there is a relationship between the dispersion in
rm quality and the precision of information about that quality, i.e. that as
zH increases p would increase a well. The limit of H as zH ! 1 is 12 p .
Indeed, if information precision and rm quality are positively related then we
may observe roughly constant levels of H across jobs and industries.




1  (2  p)c ; c 
1
2
then H is constant and equal to c.
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Proof. Substituting this value in for zH in equation 5 yields a constant value
for H .
Empirical estimates of the importance of, for example, information avail-
ability for employees on incentive intensity cannot be made without considering
other relevant parameters. In this model, that means that rm quality disper-
sion must be taken into account.
To analyze the size of the optimal signing bonus as information changes,
recall that the signing bonus is equal to
SH = (1  p)(H(1  H)zH   wH) > 0 (8)
Then we have the following results
Proposition 8 The signing bonus o¤ered by the high quality rm is decreasing
in signal strength and increasing in rm quality dispersion.
Signing bonuses shrink as signal quality increases. As p! 1, in fact, equa-
tion 8 reveals that the optimal signing bonus SH ! 0, which is an equilibrium
value of the signing bonus in the full information case. As information becomes
more accurate, there is less need for a costly signal of rm quality via the signing
bonus and the reduced incentive intensity.
Prot at the high type of rm also increases as signal strength increases:
revenue increases as incentives can be adjusted toward the optimal level while
the total cost of paying the employee, which equals u+ S, decreases along with
S.
Wrapping up this section we discuss why incentive intensity and the size of
the signing bonus move in opposite directions relative to underlying parameters
like signal strength and quality dispersion. Both a positive signing bonus and
low incentive intensity are costly for the rm, but in each case the cost is lower
for the high quality rm. It is surprising that low incentive intensity is a
signal of high quality, but in words the story is approximately as follows: "We
can o¤er incentives that cause employees to underwork and we can still earn a
prot. Thats how productive our technology is!" Only a high quality rm can
make that claim. The corresponding claim for signing bonuses is "We are so
condent that youll like what you see after joining the rm that well give you
pay up front, unconditionally, knowing that youll stay on." Importantly, the
employee IR still binds at the equilibrium described above: the signing bonus is
a cost borne by the high quality rm over and above the minimum necessary to
attract the low type of employee. However, as the rm raises the signing bonus
it can also raise incentive intensity to more e¢ cient levels. The solution to the
optimization is interior.
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4.2 The e¢ cient operation case: u  1
2
We briey consider the case where it is e¢ cient for the low quality rm to
operate without attempting to mimic the high quality rm. In this case we
consider the same constraints as before, with the exception that the low type
of rms IC once again includes specied low type actions that maximize its
prot given that it reveals itself. The solution to this problem is the same as
in equation 11, with L = 1; wL = u   12 . The low type of rm certainly will
not o¤er a signing bonus as this does not a¤ect the employee IR but negatively
a¤ects the rms objective.
The optimization problem here is equivalent to the one in section 4.1 with
the redening of u = 12   u. The marginal prot relative to  does not change
with this change in the low rms incentive compatibility constraint, but ICL
is looser, allowing for a smaller signing bonus than before. The comparative
statics do not change in this case given that a SPSPBE exists, but the lower
value of u will sometimes prevent existence. For any given p, nonexistence
would occur for values of zH close to 1 (low quality dispersion) but there would
exist a zH(p) such that for any zH  zH(p) SPSPBEs would exist.
5 Taking theory to the data
The preceding analysis has uncovered a relationship between parameters de-
scribing a particular job or industry, namely the dispersion of rm specic
productivity within the industry and quality of information regarding those
productivity, and the existence and size of compensation elements like perfor-
mance incentives and signing bonuses. Surprisingly, within an industry the
more productive rms have weaker performance incentives but they o¤er sign-
ing bonuses instead. Furthermore, incentive intensity and the size of the signing
bonus move in opposite directions as information improves or rm productivity
dispersion changes. It would seem that empiricists should nd a negative rela-
tionship between these contractual elements, yet it seems very likely that they
would instead nd a positive relationship.
In fact, the implied negative relationship in this paper is only within one
job/industry pair. Across jobs or industries this relationship might reverse.
There are three important considerations when taking this model to the data
which will be discussed in turn.
5.1 Empirical implications of censoring
Low quality rms in section 4.1 do not operate. All rms that would be present
in the industry or the data would o¤er the same incentive pay and the same
signing bonus. It may seem unlikely that the condition u < 12 would typically
be valid, but consider that industries with a high human capital to physical
capital ratio are likely to be the ones where we nd signing and performance
bonuses in practice, and are also the ones where it is most likely for low quality
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rms to drop out of the data. Additionally, this analysis was done with only one
type of employee. In practice we are likely to nd assortative matching, with
the best employees going to the best rms. In this analysis we must interpret
a rm getting employees who are not the best as "dropping out of the data"
but in practice they would simply be getting lower quality employees. They
would pay the employees less overall, but within their tier the same relationship
found in this paper might hold. So long as this is true, the negative relationship
between performance and signing bonuses would be true within each tier but
across tiers would likely reverse.
5.2 Two measures of performance pay
Returning to a previous discussion, there are two distinct concepts for what
"incentive intensity" means. In this paper it refers to the fraction of the value
of the marginal product retained by the employee. It does not describe the
dollar value of the performance bonus, though this is certainly an equally valid
denition. In this paper, within one job/industry pair (or job/industry/tier
triple if the analysis in section 5.1 is to your liking) the fraction of the value of
the marginal product retained by employees is lower for contracts with signing
bonuses, but the dollar value of the performance bonus is actually higher when
a signing bonus is o¤ered. Taking this to the data, it is necessary to consider
the fraction of product retained and not the level of performance pay when
evaluating the success of this model.
5.3 (Un)Hidden action
The preceding two arguments notwithstanding, it still seems that bonuses of all
types go together. The analysis in this paper supports this view so long as
one small adjustment is made. There are many situations, in practice, where
the employees actions are not hidden: e¤ort is observable. In this case there
is no need for a performance bonus because e¤ort can simply be monitored
and mandated. Without the performance bonus there is also no capacity for
the signing bonus to signal rm quality because rm quality is irrelevant to a
employee who is not receiving a performance bonus: she only cares what she is
paid and how hard she is expected to work. Without hidden action (or hidden
information of a employees type, which has been excluded from the model for
simplicity but is equally relevant) there is neither a signing nor a performance
bonus. In the data, there would be many observations with zeros for these
two contractual features. A regression of signing bonus on performance bonus
would be strongly positive, but rather than discount the ndings of this paper
this regression would strongly support them. If the purpose of a signing bonus
is as a signal in order to either get better employees or induce higher e¤ort,
it must be coupled with performance pay that rewards employees for either
quality or e¤ort.
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6 The "signing loan" v. the signing bonus
The signing bonus is the antithesis of "pay for performance", a concept many
academics and practitioners hold dear. Money is paid to a employee up front
and unconditionally, often before the employee has spent a day or week at the
rm, and usually within the rst month. The employee may then quit the rm
and keep the money. While legally the rm is usually entitled to get back a
pro-rated portion of the bonus, in practice it would be too costly for the rm
to do so. Lawsuits, ill-will and bad press are all likely to be more costly than
potentially retrieving the money is worth.
Most arguments in favor of these bonuses confuse justications for high pay
with justications for signing bonuses, but even the ones that correctly focus
on the timing and conditionality of the payment rather than the level miss an
important point. Consider an alternative scheme: o¤er the same cash ows to
the employee, but call the signing bonus a "loan", at 0% interest, to be repaid
in equal installments over the course of the employees rst year at the rm.
The only legal di¤erence between these two contracts is that if the employee
leaves the rm within the rst year, the rm can report any unpaid principal
to the credit bureaus as a charged o¤ debt. This would negatively impact
the employees life enough to make repaying the pro-rated portion of the bonus
optimal.10 Arguments that support a particular structure of cash ows that
include a signing bonus (e.g. Van Wesep (2008b)) can not in general support
the bonus as opposed to this alternative. This paper can.
There is no signaling power in the "signing loan" as it would enter the
employees IR constraint equally for each rm. The signing loan would just
be an advance on the wage and could therefore not signal rm quality. Only
a bonus which is sunk once paid has that power. That this theory supports
signing bonuses as opposed to signing loans is, I believe, a testament to its
inherent plausibility. It is worth noting that signing loans are sometimes part
of a rms contract o¤er to high human capital employees, but these loans are
usually in addition to signing bonuses and are explicitly for expenses related to
moving or to fund the gap between the end of one job and the start of the next.
7 Conclusion
This paper is the rst to o¤er a rationale for signing bonuses, one of the most
prevalent features of white collar labor contracts. I show that signing bonuses
are an equilibrium contract feature at rms with high hidden quality, as dened
by the marginal product of employee e¤ort, and serve as a signal to employees
of that quality. As information regarding rm quality is less readily available
to employees, the size of signing bonuses o¤ered by high quality rms increases.
10Consider that this penalty is the only practical one any of us face from non-payment of a
debt. If we decline to pay a $4,000 debt to Capital One, we will not be sued and collectors
will have little recourse. The fact that most people, especially those with higher incomes who
are more likely to end up in jobs with signing bonuses, pay their debts suggests that this is a
su¢ cient deterrent.
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I argue that industries with high human rather than physical capital probably
have murkier information and greater dispersion of quality, which both imply
higher signing bonuses. In fact, we may not even see low quality rms in these
industries as employees, possessing most of the rms capital, are able to retain
high fractions of their product in equilibrium. In this case, all rms in these
industries would o¤er signing bonuses.
This paper is also the rst to show that incentive intensity may be lower
at higher quality rms. Within a job/industry pair, lower quality rms reveal
themselves and set incentives optimally. Higher quality rms can use di¤erent
incentives as a signal and it is less expensive to induce too little e¤ort than too
much. The size of the optimal incentive intensity at high quality rms depends
on the availability of information and the dispersion of rm quality within the
job/industry. As information becomes more available, high quality rms can
increase incentive intensity without succumbing to imitation from low quality
rms. As dispersion of quality grows incentive intensity at high quality rms
shrinks, certainly a counter intuitive result. It should be noted, however, that
while incentive intensity shrinks, employees are working harder and being paid
more! The additional marginal product from being at a better rm outweighs
the lower incentives. Firm prot is also increasing in dispersion.
These results suggest that performance bonuses should be lower when signing
bonuses are higher, but only within a job and/or industry. Across jobs and
industries we should expect to see the opposite relationship. If employee e¤ort
and type are observable for rms, both signing and performance bonuses are
unnecessary, and their sizes would take values of 0 in the data. When e¤ort (or
type) is unobservable, we will often see both bonuses . Therefore a regression
of one bonus type on the other would yield signs with di¤erent coe¢ cients
depending upon whether job/industry xed e¤ects are included.
Finally, this model justies the existence of signing bonuses as opposed to
signing loans, a justication sorely lacking in colloquial understanding of signing
bonuses. While this seems like a minor point, the existence of signing bonuses
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9 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1.
If we assume that the rms IR constraints do not bind, solving the game is









Clearly S and w are interchangeable in the rms objective function but only
w factors into the IR constraint. Therefore the rm must set S = 0. The IR
constraint should bind so the optimization problem reduces to
max





) (1  2)z2i + z2i = 0
)  = 1; w = u  1
2
z2i (11)
This result is only valid if the rmsIR constraints are not violated:
IRi : i(1  i)z2i   Si   wi  0
) 1
2
z2i  u (12)
Proof of lemma 1. The relevant ICs and IRs when the signal is completely
uninformative are:
ICw : e = E(z j S;w; ) (13)
IRw : w +
1
2
2E(z j S;w; )2  u (14)
ICH : H(1  H)z2H   SH   wH  (1  )zH   S   w (15)
8S  0; w;  s:t:w + 1
2
2  u (16)
IC1L : L(1  L)  SL   wL  (1  )  S   w (17)
8S  0; w;  s:t:w + 1
2
2  u (18)
IC2L : L(1  L)  SL   wL  H(1  H)zH   SH   wH (19)
IRH : H(1  H)z2H   SH   wH  0 (20)
IRL : L(1  L)  SL   wL  0 (21)
These constraints are similar to those in section 3.1 with three notable
changes. First, the employees IR and IC now include an expectation of z rather
26
than z itself. As z is unobservable to the employee, she must act on the basis of
her belief about z. Second, the high type of rm now must compare its prot
from taking its assigned actions and being correctly perceived as a high quality
rm (thereby generating higher e¤ort from the employee and allowing it to pay
a lower set wage) or deviating and being perceived as low quality. Third, the
low quality rm now has two ICs, the rst as before and the second comparing
the prot from taking its assigned actions to its prot by o¤ering a contract set
out for the high type and being perceived as a high type of rm.
To solve this game we proceed by assuming that the rm IRs do not bind
and then solving for the low types optimal action given that it will be perceived
as a low type. Only this contract o¤er will satisfy constraint IC1L. As before
in equation 11, the optimal contract is L = 1 and wL = u   12 with SL = 0.
This assumes of course that 12  u so that the low rms IR is not violated. We









Clearly the rm will set S = 0, and will let the constraint bind so that
w = u  12
2 and the problem becomes
max





) (1  2)zH +  = 0
)  = 1
2  1=zH




; S = 0 (22)
The rm ICs can be reduced to







  ug  H(1  H)zH   SH   wH






Proof of proposition 3. The optimization must satisfy the employees IR and
the low type rms IC. As S and w enter equally into the objective function and
the low rms IC, but only w enters into the employees IR, we can set S = 0.
So long as the employee IR binds at the optimum, this action does not restrict
the set of optima, but we must check this choice later. Now the two constraints
become
w  maxfu  1
2





To solve this problem, we can assume each constraint binds in turn and
assume the other does not. We then can solve for the optimal contract and
check whether our assumption was correct. If indeed the other constraint does
not bind, then we have a candidate equilibrium. For each candidate equilibrium
we then check which makes the rm best o¤ and the that equilibrium is the
unique SPSPBE satisfying the intuitive criterion. Let us suppose that the low
rms IC binds so that we have w = u+ (1  )zH   12 . Then the objective is
max

 = (1  )z2H   u  (1  )zH +
1
2
) (1  2)zH(zH   1) = 0
)  = 1
2
; w = u+
1
4
(zH   2) (23)












It was shown in equation 4 that separating equilibria exist for values of
zH & 1:8 . Inequality 24 above suggests that so long as zH > 43 , we can
also assume that the employee IR constraint does not bind at the equilibrium
satisfying the intuitive criterion, so our initial assumption was correct given that
a separating equilibrium exists. If the employee IR binds then the equilibrium
satisfying the intuitive criterion is found by
max





) (1  )z2H = 0
 = 1; w = u  1
2
z2H (25)
At these values the low rm IC becomes
z2H  1
which never holds. Our initial candidate equilibrium is therefore the unique








Also, because the employee IR does not bind, our earlier decision to set S = 0
was too restrictive. In fact, any choice of S such that w = u   S + 14 (zH   2)




H = u  18z
2
H are equivalent in the eyes of the rm.
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Proof of proposition 4. We search for separating pure strategy perfect
Bayesian equilibria as before by writing each rms IC and IR constraints as
well as the employees IC and IR constraint. These are
ICw : e = E(z j S;w; ) (26)
IRw : w +
1
2
2E(z j S;w; )2  u (27)
ICH : H(1  H)z2H   SH   wH  (1  )zH   S   w (28)
8S  0; w;  s:t:w + 1
2
2  u (29)
IC1L : 0   SH + (1  p)(H(1  H)zH   wH) + pI(H(1  H)  wH)(30
IRH : H(1  H)z2H   SH   wH  0 (31)
where I is an indicator dened previously to take a value of 1 if wH+
2z2L > 0
and 0 otherwise. The rst major change from the set of inequalities in equations
13 to 21 is the addition of an indicator function in the low types incentive
compatibility constraint. Whether the employee remains at the rm when a
signal of bz = L is received depends on whether the employees payo¤ at the low
rm exceeds u. This in turn depends on the contract o¤er made by the rm
prior to the signal being received.
In searching for equilibria we can reuse our simplication of the high type of
rms incentive compatibility constraint from equation 22 to rewrite ICH : H(1 
H)z
2
H   SH   wH  zH(2 1=zH)2   u: Within our range of acceptable values of
u, ICH may be either more or less restrictive than IRH so neither can be elim-
inated. This yields the following constraints
IRw : w +
1
2
2E(z j bz; S; w; )2  u




ICL : 0   SH + (1  p)(H(1  H)zH   wH) + pI(H(1  H)  wH)
IRH : H(1  H)z2H   SH   wH  0
Proof of proposition 5. We must compare the rm prot from this contract
o¤er to the highest prot it could attain by o¤ering some other contract and
being perceived as a low type and receiving zH(2 1=zH)2   u > 0. Firm prot is
H = H(1  H)z2H   SH   wH
= Hz
2
H   u  SH
=
zH   (1  p)
(2  p)zH   2(1  p)
z2H   pu
 (1  p) zH   (1  p)





zH   (1  p)







Comparing prot in the proposed equilibrium to prot from the best possible
deviation we compare
zH   (1  p)




zH   (1  p)

1 +
zH   (1  p)















Our assumptions driving this section require that u > 12 so a separating
equilibrium exists for zH  1. Now consider zH  1. Then we get a value on
the RHS of comparison 32 of 14 while the LHS has a limit of innity. As zH
rises the importance of the high rm identifying itself grows: when the employee
correctly identies a rm as a high type, she works harder by exerting e¤ort
eH = HzH . The higher the value of zH , the larger the e¤ect on e¤ort that
the employees belief has. Because an equilibrium exists as the technological
di¤erence shrinks to zero, we are assured that as the technological di¤erence
rises we can be assured that a separating equilibrium exists.
Proof of proposition 6. The unique contract satisfying the intuitive criterion
is found by the following constrained maximization program.
fSH ; wH ; H) = arg max
S;w;
 = (1  )z2H   S   w






Assuming rst that wH + 12
2
H  u so that the employee will quit upon
the low type rm being revealed, the low type IC constraint is 0   SH +
(1   p)(H(1   H)zH   wH). Because the high rms objective function is
decreasing in S and w one for one, and because decreases in w only decrease
the RHS of ICL (1  p) times as fast as decreases in S, two facts follow. First,
ICL binds so that SH = (1  p)(H(1  H)zH   wH). Second, SH should be
increased and wH decreased until the employees IR binds: wH = u   12
2z2H .
The problem then becomes
H = argmax









The rst order condition for  is
0 = (1  H)z2H   (1  p)zH [(1  2H) + HzH ]
Proof of proposition 8. Taking a derivative of the signing bonus with respect
to signal precision yields
@SH
@p
=  (H(1  H)zH   wH)
+(1  p)((1  2H)0HzH   w0H)
=  zH(H(1  H)  wH)
  p (1  p)
[(2  p)zH   2(1  p)]2
zH(1  p)((1  2H) + HzH)
The rst term is negative (from equation 8) and the second is negative
because zH > 1. Therefore we have @SH@p < 0.
Next we evaluate how the size of the signing bonus depends on zH , the ratio
of the rmsproductivity. From the equation SH = (1 p)(H(1 H)zH wH)
we can directly evaluate the e¤ect of zH . As zH rises H falls, but because
H >
1








This is less than 0 so long as zH
@H
@zH
+ H < 0. To check this we can plug




+ H =  zH
p (1  p)
[(2  p)zH   2(1  p)]2
+
zH   (1  p)
(2  p)zH   2(1  p)
=
 (2  p)z2H + 4(1  p)zH   2(1  p)
[(2  p)zH   2(1  p)]2
This is less than 0 so long as the numerator is less than 0. The numerator is




1 p=2 < 1 so this condition is always
satised. The numerator takes a value of  2 when zH = 1 and therefore is
always negative. Therefore wH is decreasing in zH and  wH is increasing in zH .
The signing bonus is increasing zH : as the rmsproductivity get increasingly



















Professor 1 1 5 2 4
Waiter 1 2 4 1 5
Start-up 5 5 1 5 3
Consultant 3 4 3 4 2
CEO 4 3 2 3 1
Table 1: Rank-order for each profession in each of four categories with one
being the lowest and ve being the highest. Signing bonus size and incen-
tive intensity describe a typical contract while quality observability, employee
observability and quality dispersion describe the job or industry.
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Figure 1: Hiring bonus availability di¤ers by job class. Jobs involving greater
human capital are more often associated with signing bonuses.
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Figure 2: Signing bonuses are typically set independantly from other pay com-
ponents.
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Figure 3: The size of signing bonuses di¤er by job class. With the exception of
sales managers, larger signing bonuses are given to employees in jobs requiring
greater human capital.
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Figure 4: A majority of signing bonuses are given at or before the rst paycheck.
Figure 5: Bonuses delivered at a date after the rst paycheck are typically given
within one or two quarters of the employees start date.
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Figure 6: The set of separating pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. So
long as a SPSPBE eqists, the set of such equilibria takes the crescent shape
shown with the top boundary dened by the high quality rms IC and the
bottom boundary dened by the low quality rms IC. In the gure, wH and
SH are treated eaually, but the level of IRw depends on wH only. As SH
increases and wH decreases, maintaining a constant value on the wH + SH axis
in the gure, the curve representing IRw increases.
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